Introduction
This note draws on my work on understanding and writing about non-discrimination protections in the constitution and special legislations, in order to restate some fundamental premises of such protections. The context is provided by the University Grants Commission (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026, released on 13 January, and stayed by the Supreme Court of India on 22 January 2026 after protest and petitioning by general category students.
I begin with the Preamble and the single objective of the Regulations. The Preamble simply restates the constitutional mandate on non-discrimination and equality – primarily Article 15 rights – the fundamental, justiciable right to substantive equality through the elimination of discrimination: It ‘recognises ‘all students are able to thrive in the education system’; It states that the UGC is ‘determined to eradicate discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, or against persons with disabilities in Higher Education Institutions’; and to ‘promote equity in Higher Education Institutions’(emphasis added).
The Objective of the Regulations is likewise unequivocal and clear – also based on the letter and spirit of Article 15:
‘To eradicate discrimination only on the basis of religion, race, gender, place of birth, caste, or disability, particularly against the members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, socially and educationally backward classes, economically weaker sections, persons with disabilities, or any of them, and to promote full equity and inclusion amongst the stakeholders in higher education institutions.’
Vulnerability to Discrimination
The Regulations attempt to address the lived experience of vulnerability to discrimination faced by members of marginalised communities who enter the education system fending off obstacles and barriers erected in a society broken by majoritarianism, caste and structural inequality. This is a massive task. The UGC as an institutional regulator in higher education has especially in the past decade played a far from laudatory role in safeguarding institutional autonomy and academic freedom. That the Commission even moved to approve and notify these guidelines is stunning testimony to the cascading of anti-caste protest in the face of death and maiming by Dalit and Adivasi communities in the country. And to the tenacity of their advocates who shepherded this demand through courts and the UGC. Most of all, the tenacity of the mothers – Radhika Vemula and Abeda Tadvi – who continue to stand and confront discrimination and the aftermath of caste violence, their suffering the lens through which they see the light of truth and freedom for children like theirs. This is no easy task. It is no ordinary act either. The annihilation of caste exacts unimaginable costs from those who speak truth to the power of caste. It is this power of unwavering and cascading rejection of caste orders that unsettles those who are unable to step out of dominant frames of thinking and think equality for a change.
It need not be reiterated here that (a) these protections are rarely available in fact to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (as we know from incidents of massacre and gruesome murder stretching from Kizhvenmani in 1967 to Hathras in 2020 – the south to the north); and (b) targeted assault and atrocity are the singular experience of Dalits and Adivasis in India, not of the ‘touchable’ savarna castes – who are either perpetrators, bystanders, or witnesses, never victims. This is a specificity of the caste order in the Hindu social order. There are several official reports that record the various forms of discrimination against the Scheduled Castes (starting with the Elayaperumal Report in 1965, the Justice K. Punnayya Commission Report, 2000), the Scheduled Tribes (the Xaxa Committee Report, 2014) and women.
The demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the mass violence against Muslims in Bombay (Mumbai) that followed, and the Justice Srikrishna Committee Report as well as the independent Citizens’ Tribunal on Ayodhya (1994) noted with concern the heightened violence and politics of hate that targeted Muslims across the country led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Sangh Parivar and underscored the suffering this imposed on economically and socially vulnerable Muslims. Within this, Imtiaz Ahmad’s pathbreaking work on stratification among Muslims had clearly pointed towards marginality and vulnerability of large sections of Indian Muslims. However, the mobilisation around ‘backwardness’ or the identification of Muslim OBCs had to wait more than a decade to enter deliberations on the backward classes and the most backward classes. The report of the Sachar Committee published in 2006 focussing on discrimination against Muslims in India merit recall in this context:
‘There is an urgent need to recognize diversity in residential, work and educational spaces, apart from enhancing inclusion of the really deprived SRCs in 'spaces' created by public programmes and policy interventions. The need for equity and inclusion in a pluralistic society can never be over-emphasized. But the mechanisms to ensure equity and equality of opportunity to bring about inclusion should be such that diversity is achieved and at the same time the perception of discrimination is eliminated’ (pp. 237-38).
Representatives of the general category have argued ‘discrimination’ is not unidirectional and that they are vulnerable as well, and therefore, the specific reference to scheduled castes and tribes and other backward classes be removed from the regulation. They have also argued that it is liable to be misused against them.
What is the basis for this fear? There are no available reports that have documented the systemic abuse, mistreatment or discrimination against general category students as members of the general category. Regulations of this nature that draw on the logic of the constitution must be evidence-based. We lack evidence of discrimination as being bi-directional. The overwhelming evidence on record (on which this government supported overwhelmingly by the general category has based its regulations) is on the pervasive discrimination faced by students and faculty belonging to the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes and Muslims. The backlash that we witness therefore is without any evidentiary basis, and probably triggered by the fear that there will no longer be a guarantee of impunity for habits of discrimination. The fear that any targeted hostility against a Dalit or Adivasi student or teacher or employee will invite investigation and punitive measures.
Enrolment in educational institutions at all levels, access to public goods, and indices of well-being on multiple counts are overwhelmingly in favour of the general category – and the number of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe persons who are able to secure seats or employment in the general category are miniscule. Although there is widespread opposition to reservations by persons belonging to the general category, the category has accessed a quota for itself in the economically weaker sections (EWS) category. Belonging to an EWS is not evidence of discrimination, although it might be evidence of deprivation. This is not a class-based claim but an individual claim based on income and assets of individual families identified on a case by case basis. This is a critical difference.
In effect therefore, the ‘casteless’ general category consists of people who do not belong to the groups listed as discriminated against in Article 15.
Defining Discrimination
To return to the substance of the Regulations, caste-based discrimination is defined in Clause 3 (c) of the Regulations as ‘discrimination against scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and Other Backward Classes.’ This is drawn from two constitutional sources: Article 15 and 16 which in addition to SCs and STs provide reservations to OBCs and Special provisions for Women; and Article 17 – the prohibition of untouchability. The reference to ‘caste’ in Article 15 (1), is qualified in 15(2), (4) and (5). ‘Castes’ in 15(1) that are protected against discrimination are castes that continue to experience a historical vulnerability in the graded social order of caste. Legislation interlinked with Article 17 like the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act and the Protection of Civil Rights Act, provide comprehensive criminal law protections against discrimination, segregation, untouchability and violence – its propagation and practice.
The Constitution of India does not define Discrimination. However, international conventions provide a cogent definition of discrimination. The International Convention on all forms of Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination in the first Article as follows:
‘the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, in the first Article defines discrimination against women as follows:
‘the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.’
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in Article 2 defines discrimination as follows:
‘"Discrimination on the basis of disability" means any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation’
The UGC Regulations in Clause 3(c) quoted at the beginning of this section, draws on Article 15. These are classes of people vulnerable to being subjected to unfair treatment on a sustained basis in societies (of which institutions of higher education are part). Clause 3(e) provides a general definition of discrimination, that may be experienced by the classes above that are structurally vulnerable:
‘“Discrimination” means any unfair, differential, or biased treatment or any such act against any stakeholder, whether explicit or implicit, on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, disability, or any of them. It also includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation, or preference which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education and, in particular, of imposing conditions on any stakeholder or group of stakeholders which are incompatible with human dignity.’
Clause 3 (e) bears a striking similarity to definitions of discrimination in international law and must be read with 3 (c) – and both, together and in their interreading constitute a special regulation furthering the reach of the fundamental right to non-discrimination under the Constitution in institutions of higher education.
Equity and Due Diligence
Equity is defined in the regulations as ‘a level playing field for all stakeholders with respect to the entitlement and opportunity for the enjoyment of all legitimate rights.’ This is a constitutional mandate – protected by the principle of non-retrogression – reaffirmed over a period of seventy five years, drawing in the developments in international law, and seeking due diligence from reluctant governments. The Regulations, in Section 4, cast a duty on institutions of higher education to ‘eradicate discrimination’, ‘promote equity’ and institute ‘appropriate protective measures to eliminate discrimination’ ‘without any prejudice to their caste, creed, religion, language, ethnicity, gender, or disability’. Importantly it casts the duty of due diligence on the heads of institutions of higher education and carries consequences for non-compliance.
The complicity of the vice chancellor of the then University of Hyderabad in triggering the chain of events leading to Rohith Vemula’s death can scarcely be brushed under the carpet or forgotten.
The duty to eliminate discrimination is a constitutional mandate. Every faculty member, every student, every head of every institution are duty bound to comply and cooperate in the creation of an environment of equal fellowship. This is not a question of choice. It is non-negotiable. And yet, the weak link of the Regulations shows up in the section on the Equal Opportunity Centre, where, it is stated that the Executive Committee ‘shall nominate a regular professor or a senior faculty member who has an innate interest in the welfare of disadvantaged social groups as Coordinator of the centre’ (emphasis added). What does this mean? How will an Executive Committee determine which faculty member has an innate interest and who does not? It is not far-fetched to say that this task will become the burden of those faculty members who belong to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, who are rendered relatively powerless within institutional settings as they now are. Why is it not stated that every person in the rank of Associate Professor and above must mandatorily serve a term as Coordinator, as part of their official duties, and the positive steps taken by them to combat discrimination on campuses will enter their record of service? This is an intrinsic part of what it means to be a teacher. Student representatives are to be nominated as members based on academic excellence and merit. This is the precise rhetoric used to stigmatise Dalit and Adivasi scholars who enter institutions of higher education, and form the basis for the merit vs. reservation argument that entrenches discrimination and isolation in intractable ways in the Brahmanical enclosures of higher education.
Conclusion
Scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward classes, persons with disabilities and women are the classes of persons subjected to structural inequality who are recognised in the UGC regulations as constituencies in need of anti-discrimination protections. Muslims and transqueer communities do not find mention although their experiences of discrimination are documented and part of the public record.
There is much room to tighten the regulations and we have several extremely well-reasoned commentaries on them in the last week that can point to a way forward.
The bogey of ‘misuse’ is an old, worn down one. Without labouring the point, we live in a time when every law, every regulation is observed in its breach. I have sat on university departmental committees as an expert and have pushed back against extremely biased decisions not backed by reason or evidence against Dalit scholars. I have raised the question of unfair standards in violation of UGC norms set to screen Dalit applicants for teaching positions. I have advised Dalit and Adivasi faculty and university administrations on decisions to apply for unreserved positions and move out of a reserved post – the resistance to this shift to a general post is strong from the most liberal administrators, not because the claimant lacks merit, but because the resistance knows no reason. This is all part of the savarna Brahmanical pushback that Dalits and Adivasis in higher education institutions must fight on a daily basis.
Governments misuse laws with impunity, courts misapply bail protections and remission rules, election commissions misuse their mandate with zero accountability, investigators misuse laws of evidence, and corporations derail every legal norm in place.
“General category employees and students need to be deschooled from the insidious Brahmanical protocols of caste and disciplined into the methods of radical equality – this is the biggest challenge.”
Courts and regulatory authorities are expected to adjudicate on allegations of misuse and on allegations of discrimination, both (whether or not they fulfil this duty and how diligently is another question altogether). Since when has ‘misuse’ become a reason to remove a protection? And since when has the chance of misuse become adequate justification to suspend the operation of a law? Why did the court stay the regulations in such haste and what in the regulations renders it ‘easy to misuse’ is difficult to fathom.
Just as the Constitution does not give citizens an option to be non-discriminatory in their everyday conduct, this constitutional commitment must trickle down to normative and regulatory apparatuses at the lowest level in order for non-discrimination to become a reality. General category employees and students need to be deschooled from the insidious Brahmanical protocols of caste and disciplined into the methods of radical equality – this is the biggest challenge. The Supreme Court has thrown away an opportunity to set this process in motion by staying the regulations taking on board the very arguments that derail the constitutional mandate.